We report that, for the generation of a secure cryptographic key from correlations established through a noisy quantum channel, the quantum and classical advantage distillation procedures are not equivalent, when coherent eavesdropping attacks are duly taken into account. The quantum procedure can tolerate markedly more noise in the channel than the classical procedure.
One of the important problems in quantum cryptography is whether classical methods of key distillation are equivalent to quantum methods. This problem was recently investigated for a certain class of protocols in Refs. [1, 2, 3] . It was concluded there that the quantum entanglement distillation [4] tolerates exactly the same amount of errors in a raw cryptographic key as classical advantage distillation [5] . The analysis was carried out under the assumption that Eve performs the most general incoherent attack.
In this short note [6] we report that this equivalence is only apparent, in fact classical advantage distillation is not as powerful as quantum entanglement distillation. This is so because Eve has the option of coherent attacks which give her more information than what she can get from incoherent attacks. Roughly speaking, Eve exploits the classical information she gains from the public communication exchanged between Alice and Bob as part of the advantage distillation protocol.
Alice sends qunits to Bob, that is n-dimensional quantum systems, and the raw key sequence consists of the paired nit values for matching measurement bases. The security of the protocols of [1, 2, 3] for quantum cryptography can be expressed solely in terms of the probability β 0 that Alice and Bob get the same nit value if the bases match. (We are adopting the notation of Ref. [1] .) For an ideal noiseless quantum channel, one has β 0 = 1, and β 0 = 1/n obtains for a channel that has nothing but unbiased noise. Channels with some admixture of noise are characterized by β 0 values between those extremes.
The lesson of Refs. [7, 2, 1] is that classical advantage distillation can be performed successfully if
which is also the threshold for quantum entanglement distillation [4] . This result is valid provided that incoherent eavesdropping attacks supply as much information as possible. This assumption is not implausible, inasmuch as Gisin and Cirac [8] , and Wang [9] argued that coherent eavesdropping attacks cannot be more powerful than incoherent ones. In the context of advantage distillation, however, there is a self-suggesting coherent attack that truly outperforms the best incoherent attack. Instead of measuring her ancillas one by one, Eve performs a collective measurement on a naturally chosen subset. We analyzed this scenario in full and find that the threshold of (1) is too optimistic. Rather, the true threshold is given by
This is a substantially more stringent condition on β 0 than the one in (1) that is derived for incoherent attacks only; see 
